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Defining the Nation: Kurdish Historiography
in Turkey in the 1990s
KONRAD HIRSCHLER
The subject of this article is Kurdish historiography in Turkey in the 1990s
and especially the ways in which it constructs, defines and reworks Kurdish
national identity.1 Although a number of studies exist regarding the relation-
ship between historiography and national identity in the presence of a
central state, the Kurdish national movement has not yet been the subject of
such inquiry.2 The sources used are articles from the only Kurdish daily
newspaper published in Turkey and partly in Germany (Özgür Gündem
[Free Agenda] and its successors), which has hitherto not been a subject of
research. Using these sources I will show that Kurdish national history has
been a topic of great debate among Kurdish intellectuals. On the basis of
analysis of this debate I will put forth the following arguments: (i) the
discursive space of this historiography has been mainly determined by the
Turkish national discourse in its popular version, and (ii) identity in the
Kurdish society has been constructed mainly around the core layer of
ethnicity, whereas it was based on religion or class in preceding periods.
The limited focus of this article on only one Kurdish region is due to the
recognition that the Kurdish national identity is highly fragmented. It is
characterized by the political and cultural diversity of the Other (Turk,
Persian or Arab) in each respective nation-state.3 Consequently, the starting-
point for any study of Kurdish national identity must be a localized
understanding of its relationship to the respective hegemonic national
identity. This article, therefore, seeks to understand the ways in which the
national history of the Kurds is written by Kurdish authors in Turkey in the
1990s and why it is written in specific ways. Furthermore, it attempts to
locate the main contested fields within the group and with other groups. It
is important to mention that I will not focus on the question of whether the
texts represent the past correctly or incorrectly. Thereby, I shall adopt the
approach of Geertz who stresses the importance of understanding the
societal function of ideology and science equally, regardless of the truth or
falseness they represent. Geertz defines ideology predominantly as a
cultural symbolic system, ‘maps of problematic social reality and matrixes
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for the creation of collective consciousness’ .4 It produces sense especially
in periods of quick historical change. In this way it fulfils the same function
as religion, philosophy or science, in the sense that it is concerned with a
problematic situation and offers orientation when a lack of it is perceived.
The difference between science and ideology is here mainly on a stylistic
level. Science is characterized by disinterestedness and a restrained, spare
and resolutely analytical style. Ideology, on the contrary, is characterized by
commitment and an ornate, vivid and deliberately suggestive style. Geertz’s
approach, therefore, enables us to study any text on the level of its societal
function, without necessarily discussing to which degree it is ‘true’ or
‘false’.
For the Kurdish issue few studies dealing with nationalism engage with
the recent theoretical debate5 on nationalism.6 The literature on Kurdish
nationalism is rather characterized by a mixture of modernist and perennial
approaches.7 Kurdish nationalism in Turkey has experienced four broad
phases since the early twentieth century.8 The 1920s and 30s experienced a
number of uprisings (the Shaikh Said revolt of 1925, the Ararat revolt of
1928 and the Dersim (Tunceli) revolt of 1937/38). It is necessary to stress
that religion often played a salient role in these so-called nationalist revolts
and participation was to a large degree determined by tribal patterns. The
second phase of non-activity during the 1940s–50s was broken by the third
phase in the 1960s–70s, which marked an increase in Kurdish nationalist
activities. This third phase was characterized by a high number of political
organizations, which became increasingly radical during the 1970s. Since
the coup d’état of 1980 the Kurdish national movement has been dominated
by the PKK (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan–Workers Party of Kurdistan). This
fourth phase has witnessed the longest armed Kurdish rebellion in the
history of the Turkish Republic, led by the PKK. With the arrest of its leader
Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, however, these activities have almost entirely
ceased.
The PKK has gained strong support since the inception of the armed
struggle in 1984. It developed broad organizational structures and displayed
an enormous capacity to mobilize Kurds both within and without Turkey,
especially in Europe. The rise of Kurdish nationalism since the 1980s is also
a consequence of the extremely severe policy adopted after the coup d’état
towards the expression of minority identities. Contrary to former decades
any implicit recognition of Kurdishness as socio-cultural reality was
entirely excluded, which accelerated the process of Kurdish identity
formation.9 The general trend of identity in Kurdish society has thereby
been a move from one with strong religious components in the 1920s–30s,
to one with strong class components in the 1960s–70s, to one with ethnicity
as the core layer in the 1990s.10
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Nevertheless, this spread of national Kurdish identity within Kurdish
society was (particularly in the 1980s) accompanied by the formation of
particular identities, such as identities formed on the basis of religion
(Alevis) or language (Zaza speakers).11 The factors attributed to this
development are similar to those for the former trend: aspects such as
urbanization and increased levels of education, of which modernization
theory adherents had hoped would foster the integration of populations, had
in reality the inverse effects.12 This process led to friction among existing or
newly emerging lines with according geographical definitions, as for
example ‘Zazaistan’ 13 or new perceptions of historical events, such as the
1925 and the 1937–38 rebellions, which are partly described as Zaza
rebellions.14
The Turkish Republic with its strong centralized state tradition had from its
foundation the means to disseminate a unified identity. On the historio-
graphical level this has been expressed by the Turkish Historical Thesis
(Türk Tarih Tezi) and the Sun Language Theory (Günes¸ Dil Teorisi), which
became hegemonic in the 1930s.15 Both were developed in the framework
of official historiographical institutions by writers of various backgrounds:
members of parliament, directors of museums, the Secretary of State for
education and historians. The principal argument of the Türk Tarih Tezi was
that:
from ancient times, droughts and economic seasons forced migrations
from Central Asia to the East, West and South. These migrants were
Turkish speaking […] people. They brought to the regions they settled
developed civilizations. It was they, who founded civilizations in
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Anatolia, China, Crete, India, the Aegean
regions and Rome. They were Turks. These Turkish speaking people
had the major role in founding and developing civilizations and in
spreading them to the world.16
The Günes¸ Dil Teorisi, published in 1936, is the logical complement to the
Türk Tarih Tezi in arguing that the Turkish language is the source for all
existing languages in the world. But the two theories should not be seen as
a homogeneous whole, which determined the writing of history over
decades. This is already visible in the 1940s, when the historian Mehmed
Fuad Köprülü criticized the whole new approach as romantic and
unscientific, although he considered it to be a necessary stage in the
development of nationalism. Today this heterogeneity is visible in the
difference between academic and popular discourses. In the former,
remnants of the theories are hardly visible.17 On the popular level the
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influence of it has been noticeable until today, especially in school
textbooks.18 Towards the Kurds the Turkish national discourse has taken the
stance of denial by defining them as Turks. The Kurdish question, if refer-
red to at all, was mentioned ‘in terms of reactionary politics, tribal
resistance or regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political
question’ .19 Of all the states, with Kurdish populations Turkey has been the
most active in denying their existence. Turkish national discourse has
thereby never refused to accept Kurds as Turkish citizens. Nevertheless, this
acceptance was accompanied by the voluntary or involuntary inclusion of
Kurds into the community of Turks.
The last years of the presidency of Turgut Özal in the late 1980s and
early 1990s witnessed a gradual liberation of cultural fields. The effect of
state policies, such as the withdrawal of the law on publications in other
languages than Turkish in 1991, was that identities below the level of
Turkish identity and above the level of family could be expressed more
openly. Van Bruinessen describes one of the results of this policy as a
‘veritable boom in Kurdish publishing’ within Turkey.20 Nevertheless, this
approach did not, at least concerning the Kurds, lead to a fundamental
change, and until today the very acknowledgment of any Kurdish identity is
seen as endangering the union of citizens who are by definition Turkish.
Even on the academic level the study published by Kiris¸çi and Winrow 21 is
described as ‘perhaps the first attempt to bring about a comprehensive
description and analysis of Turkey’s Kurdish problem by prominent
scholars who are themselves based in Turkish society.’ 22
This article is based on texts published in the daily Kurdish newspaper
Özgür Gündem and its successors in the years 1994–1997 (Özgür Gündem,
Özgür Ülke, Yeni Politika and Özgür Politika). This choice is determined
mainly by the absence of ‘official’ Kurdish historiographical institutions
and linked publications. For a national movement not in possession of state
structures such a newspaper is important as it reaches a relatively broad
public. At the same time, this newspaper is a relatively independent forum,
where authors of different political orientations write and historiographical
issues are openly discussed.
Özgür Gündem and its successors, taken as a whole, have had the
longest publication of any daily Kurdish newspaper in Turkey. In the 1960s,
and especially the late 1970s, a number of Kurdish journals and newspapers
had been published in Turkey.23 These were continuously subject to external
pressure and did not survive for any length of time. Özgür Gündem was
published in Istanbul from 1992 until April 1994, at which point it was
closed down. Since then it attempted several times to start anew under
148 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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different names owing to state repression and terror, not least the murder or
incarceration of a large number of the newspaper’s staff.24 From April 1994
until its closure in February 1995 it was published under the name Özgür
Ülke (Free Country), from April 1995 until the closing down in August
1995 under the name Yeni Politika (New Politics), followed by Demokrasi
(Democracy), Ülkede Gündem (Agenda in the Country) and Özgür Bakıs¸
(Free View) which closed down in April 2001. The first three versions were
distributed both in Turkey and in Europe. After the closure of Yeni Politika
the European publication took the name Özgür Politika (Free Politics)
under which it is still published in Neu-Isenburg (Germany). The co-
operation between the two newspapers after the formal split has been visible
in the high number of articles taken over by Özgür Politika from Demokrasi
and its successors. The circulation of Özgür Gündem has been estimated at
around 50,000.25 The circulation of Özgür Politika in 1999 was, according
to the newspaper’s own data, 16,723 (8,610 in Germany, 6,120 in other
countries and 1,993 subscribers).26 It is generally considered to be close to
the PKK, but is not a direct party publication. In contrast to the many direct
publications of the PKK and linked organizations, for example Serxwebûn
(Independence), it is characterized by high stylistic diversity.
Özgür Gündem and its successors are published in Turkish. This is partly
a consequence of the proscription of Kurdish within Turkey for public and,
in some periods, private use, whose result was that the language has not
been developed in accordance to newly arising needs. At the same time,
Kurdish is characterized by a high degree of regional variation, which is
typical for ‘non-national languages’.27 The use of Turkish as a lingua franca
in Özgür Politika and its successors is therefore also a deliberate choice.
The actors within the Kurdish national movement, and especially the PKK,
are highly sensitive to differences within the Kurdish community, especially
regarding dialects (Kurmanci, Zaza, Sorani). The use of Turkish can be seen
as an attempt to avoid possible rifts along linguistic lines. The choice of the
Turkish language also shows that this newspaper is directed at a public
largely educated within Turkey, or at least aware of the Turkish national
discourse.
None of the main authors 28 writing on historical subjects in the
newspapers under scrutiny is a university-trained historian. Most of them
can rather be broadly characterized as intellectuals. M. Sıraç Bilgin
graduated from the medical faculty in Diyarbakır. Cems¸id Bender
completed a PhD in law in France. Gürdal Aksoy graduated from Ankara
University also in law. Selahaddin Mihutuli graduated from Ankara
university in French philology and Torî can best be described as a linguist.
Nevertheless, some of the authors writing in the newspaper, for example
Selahaddin Mihutuli,29 Cems¸id Bender 30 and Gürdal Aksoy,31 have published
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monographs on historical subjects. Some of them have also published
literary works; for example, M. Sıraç Bilgin published a novel 32 and Torî
short stories,33 or works on other fields such as Torî’s Kurdish-Turkish
dictionary.34
The second aspect characteristic of these authors is that they are subject
to pressure due to their writings. Of the eight main authors only four
actually live in Turkey (Cems¸id Bender, Selahaddin Mihutuli, Torî, and M.
Can Yüce who is imprisoned). The four others live in exile in Europe (M.
Sıraç Bilgin, S¸erefxan Cizirî, S. I
.
zzet Güven and Gürdal Aksoy). An
additional group of authors in the newspaper write anonymously and use
collective names linked to the respective pages where historical articles are
generally published: Aras¸tırma Servisi (Research Service) or Toplum Yas¸am
Servisi (Society and Life Service). These names represent either authors
external to the newspaper or collective articles from authors working within
the newspaper.
Özgür Gündem and its successors have been a forum for debates on a
wide variety of historiographical issues. These include the necessity of
writing scientific history (tarih) in delimitation to story (söylence),35 the
question of priorities in terms of periodization,36 the need to replace Euro-
centric studies,37 the demand to shift the focus from Great Men to the
masses 38 and the usefulness of Ibn Khaldu¯ n’s historical analysis for the
present.39
The most long-lasting debate concentrates in temporal terms on one of
the main areas of Kurdish historiography in Turkey: the pre-Islamic periods.
In content it has turned around the question of whether one group of
Kurdish historians is writing an excessively nationalistic history, which
denies the existence of other peoples. In the following, I will term this group
the Monopolists, as the group which monopolizes the history of the region
in a Kurdish narrative. Their critics, the Inter-Activists, on the contrary tend
to include other peoples of the region into their narratives, at least on an
abstract level. This latter group, compared with historiographical debates in
general, assumes the role of ‘revisionists’. The debate has not been limited
to Özgür Gündem and its successors, but has found expression also in
journals 40 or in the form of monographs.41 However, in the sources used for
this article the debate intensified around the end of 1994 and the beginning
of 1995. Later historiographical articles have continued the debate initiated
in this earlier period.42
The Monopolists are attacked on the basis that they claim every aspect
of the region to be Kurdish.43 The Inter-Activists argue that they construct a
romantic and nationalistic view of history, which forms an inverted copy of
the Türk Tarih Tezi without using sources or documents.44 The Inter-
Activists fear that in this process a critical and scientific approach to history
150 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
373mes06.qxd  04/07/2001  15:42  Page 150
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
In
ge
nt
a 
Co
nt
en
t 
Di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
 -
 R
ou
tl
ed
ge
] 
At
: 
20
:3
5 
8 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
will be marginalized in the future by the imposition of an official Kurdish
history.45 Among the main proponents of the Monopolist group are Cems¸id
Bender, Torî, Selahaddin Mihutuli, Sıraç Bilgin and S. I
.
zzet Güven. The
anonymous collective authors, Aras¸tırma Servisi and Toplum Yas¸am Servisi,
also adapt stances that could be generally described as Monopolist.
The Inter-Activists agree on the existence of a Kurdish historical entity,
which has existed for thousands of years. However, they stress the existence
of other peoples in the region and their interaction with the Kurds, implying
aspects of a multi-ethnic society.46 They sometimes refute the idea of links
of descent between Kurds and early peoples, for example the Medes.47 The
Monopolists claim that their contributions are mere reactions to the valuable
studies of researchers such as Cems¸id Bender, whose level of exactness, for
instance, they do not reach.48 They argue, it is continued, with baseless
assertions intended to ridicule ‘proved opinions’. A frequent implicit
argument is that they endanger the nationalist project, because ‘[t]o rip a
people from its history means to direct it to other histories’ .49 The Inter-
Activists include writers such as Gürdal Aksoy, M. Can Yüce and S¸erefxan
Cizirî.
Differences between the two groups are also visible in the use of sources
and the writing style. As a general rule, the more clearly an author adopts
Monopolist stances, the more he tends to use an ornate writing style and the
less he tends to cite sources. This classification should not be considered 
a simple dichotomy between moderation and extremism. An Inter-Activist
writer such as Gürdal Aksoy, for instance, can write extensively on the
onomastic history of the Turks, concentrating on names linked to dogs, oxen
and similar animals.50 Neither should the classification be understood as
rigid. A Monopolist author such as Torî, for instance, has adopted a rather
Inter-Activist stance when writing within his ‘own’ field of linguistics.51
If the nation is understood to be a product of ‘invention’ or ‘imagination’,
we are confronted with the question of how a national community is
actually constructed by historicization. I will describe the elements involved
in the Kurdish case of ‘matrixes for the creation of collective
consciousness’ 52 using the concept of myth. Myth is understood here in its
original Greek meaning, as a narrative that is neither necessarily true nor
necessarily false. It neither requires nor includes a verification from outside
itself. Thus the importance of a myth is not defined by its truth-value, but
by the meaning it signifies for author and audience. The functional
importance lies in the role myths play in defining collectivities. They are a
decisive element for the process of exclusion from and inclusion into
national communities. G. Smith et al. define a number of myths, as for
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example those of ethnogenesis, homeland, Golden Age or national
character.53 The authors stress that the myths which are relevant vary for
each case. The myths actually included may overlap, sustain one another or
contradict each other. In this article I will include the myths which are the
most salient in the sources under scrutiny: myths of ethnogenesis,
homeland, resistance and national character.
The myth of ethnogenesis seeks to identify an ethnic link between the
modern nation and an ancient people in order to show an independent ‘own’
development. This is of crucial importance for the Kurds in Turkey, whose
separate existence has been denied by the national discourse for many
decades. This myth plays a salient role in the Kurdish historiography,
whereby the line between ethnicity defined on a biological basis and defined
on a cultural basis is generally very fluid. The current Monopolist version
establishes a link with the Aryans. In this narrative the Aryans are the
indigenous inhabitants of the Kurdish regions, with a history that some
authors describe as stretching as far back as 60,000 years. The modern-day
Kurds are closest to the original Aryans and are therefore considered their
grandchildren.54 One of the basic elements of this narrative is to demonstrate
an ethnic purity, which has not been strongly influenced by other peoples.
The town of Maras¸ thus ‘guarded all along history its pure Aryan character’
against foreign attacks (for example, by Assyrians, Romans, Arabs or
Turcomans).55 This Aryan version of ethnogenesis is aimed directly at the
Türk Tarih Tezi, which argues that the Turks were an Aryan race from
Central Asia. Describing the Kurds as the real descendants of the Aryans
not only defines their own ethnogenesis, but also refutes the Turkish
version.
A moderate revisionist approach is advanced by Aksoy who links the
Kurds, on an ethnic basis, to Indo-Europeans. Nevertheless, he stresses the
influences of Caucasian, Armenian and Turkish elements, thereby
challenging the purity narrative. Yüce is the only author who explicitly
refutes all attempts to establish links of biological descent over time as being
ideological and racist. Agreeing on the existence of the Kurds as a valid unit
of historical analysis, he defines this unit mainly on a cultural basis.56
Generally, there has been a tendency to expand the possible ancestral
peoples of the Kurds, since Minorsky proposed, at the beginning of this
century, the Medes.57 Bender, for example, includes the Guti, Hurrians, the
Kassites (Kashshu), Urartians and Medes in a single ethnic line.58 This led
Aksoy to comment that some contemporary Kurdish historians produce a
‘peoples’ soup’ by adding arbitrarily more and more ancestral peoples to the
already included Medes.59
While the myth of ethnogenesis establishes a link between the modern
and an ancient people, the homeland myth seeks to establish a stable
152 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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geographical existence throughout history. The Anatolian regions are the
main territories that historiographical articles published in Özgür Gündem
and its successors focus on. Turkish national discourse has argued that
owing to repeated migrations, Anatolia has become the homeland of the
Turks. It is therefore necessary for a Kurdish national narrative to prove that
these territories are in fact originally Kurdish. The centre of the Kurdish
regions is in this narrative the Eastern Taurus and the Zağros mountains,
while the exact frontiers of this homeland are not drawn. From a series of
articles on Kurdish towns at the end of 1994 we see that the towns of Maras¸,
Erzincan, Erzurum and Kars define the Western and Northern frontiers of
the area in Anatolia. Significantly, this series refers exclusively to towns
within the borders of modern-day Turkey. The Eastern and Southern borders
are consequently not defined in this framework.60 Torî describes the original
territories of the Kurdish Hurrians (approximately 1,400 BC) to be delimited
by a triangle formed by the Khabor river in the Southwest, the Diyala river
in the Southeast and Lake Van in the North. This territory is roughly
equivalent to the present day border region between Syria, Iraq, Iran and
Turkey. The narrative continues, nevertheless, to define the stable frontiers
of the Hurrian political entity to be the Mediterranean to the West and the
Tigris to the East.
The homeland narrative stresses two essential points. First, the region is
described as the ‘fatherland of the Aryans’ (whose descendants are the
Kurds),61 which is ‘our country’.62 The ancestors of the Kurds governed
regions with clear natural and cultural borders.63 Secondly, the Kurds are
described as the oldest people in the region. This is contrasted to ‘outside’
peoples, who arrived later.64 These ‘outside’ peoples (such as Persians,
Romans, Byzantines, Arabs or Turks) are depicted as invaders or occupiers
of the Kurdish regions. The definition of those considered ‘insiders’ is
varied. While it is often narrowed down to the Kurds exclusively, at times
it includes other groups or peoples, such as the Armenians and Syrian-
Orthodox.65 It is interesting that, in general, the legitimate existence of other
peoples or ethnic minorities is acknowledged on an abstract level. Similarly
the positive aspects of this multi-cultural and multi-national mosaic are
stressed. Nevertheless, these peoples or minorities are rarely found in the
concrete historical description. This description is limited to the Kurds,
except for some occasional examples.66 Other peoples, such as Armenians 67
or Circassians,68 appear mainly as victims of massacres or forced transfers
in the late Ottoman Empire.
The myth of resistance seeks to establish a narrative of eternal
opposition to foreign rule. The struggle for national liberation and the future
establishment of a nation-state is thereby represented as the result of a
teleological historical development. This means that the periods of foreign
KURDISH HISTORIOGRAPHY IN TURKEY IN THE 1990s 153
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rule lose any lasting influence and the survival of the national characteristics
can be shown. Owing to the situation of the Kurdish national movement in
Turkey in the 1990s this myth is of special importance in the representation
and formation of national identity. As described above, regarding the myth
of homeland, Kurdish historians draw a clear differentiation between
insiders and outsiders. In this narrative Kurdistan has been constantly
attacked and occupied. Despite policies of coercion, assimilation and
annihilation applied by these occupiers (mainly Arabs, Persians and Turks)
over thousands of years, the Kurds have not given up their traditions.69 This
ability to keep their characteristics is mainly linked to the long-lasting
resistance of the Kurds to these policies.70
The Newroz celebrations serve as the corner-stone of the Kurdish myth
of resistance. Newroz has an intense symbolic meaning for the Kurdish
national movement. During the 1980s and 1990s, it has become an occasion
for large scale celebrations in Europe and in the Kurdish regions in Turkey,
being regularly severely suppressed in the latter by the Turkish military
forces. Newroz is also a highly contested discursive field since the Turkish
state tries to introduce its own interpretation of the symbolic content, similar
to the Iranian state. In 1995 Newroz was declared to be a Turkish holiday
celebrating the day the Turks left their Central Asian homeland, Ergenekon.
Newroz was now referred to in its Turkified version as Nevruz. At the same
time, Newroz has often been represented as a mere spring celebration.
The mythological Kurdish version is that the blacksmith Kawa liberated
the Kurds from a tyrant who ate every day the brains of two youngsters.
After Kawa killed the tyrant fires were lit on the mountains of Kurdistan on
21 March in order to celebrate the liberation. On a historiographical level
this event has been dated to the victory of the Medes over the Assyrians in
612 BC, which signified the end of the Assyrian polity. This event is
considered crucial by Monopolists, as the Medes ‘united all Aryan peoples
under one flag and saved thereby the region from the occupying and
destroying Scythians’ .71 This victory is also perceived as signifying the end
of centuries of coercion by the Semites over the Kurds. The Kurds have
since then celebrated the occasion every year with Newroz, which is also the
first day of the Kurdish calendar.72 In this narrative ‘Kawa becomes the
desire for liberation, the desire to rise up against oppression.’ 73
Varol, on the contrary, argues that Kawa and Newroz were only linked
recently. In the whole Kurdish literature and historical writings, for example
in the late sixteen century S¸erefxan’s S¸erefname,74 the name Kawa is not
mentioned. He suggests that Kawa has taken the place of the hero of the
Persian Mihrican myth, in which he had originally been a second-class hero.
The Mihrican myth is in its meaning similar to the contemporary Newroz.
In the following Kawa was placed from this myth into the already existing
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Newroz framework, which at this point did not have the actual meaning of
resistance.75
I have already referred several times to the insider/outsider perception in
the description of historical events. This opposition of the two groups is in
the case under scrutiny mainly aimed at Turks. The myth of national
character fills the existing framework with attributes in order to describe a
separate past clearly distinct from that of the Other. Thereby we have
throughout history a bundle of dichotomistic characteristics.
Together with the myth of resistance, the myth of national character
plays a salient role for showing not only origins, but also continuity.
This is achieved by constructing the narrative around the idea of the
civilized insider and the barbaric outsider. The myth of civilization versus
barbarism is a recurring theme in the sources. Monopolist authors like
Bender, Torî and Mihutuli use it as a central concept in their analysis of
history.76 Mihutuli states in this regard that the importance of peoples in
history is not bound to the fame they gained, but bound to the ‘services in
the field of civilization, the remaining cultural elements and the
consolidation of history’s richness’ .77 Bender enumerates the achievements
of the Kurds in this field who were the first to tame horses, farm wheat,
build settlements outside caves, build temples, introduce mathematical and
geometric principles and use a telescope.78 The Near East is considered the
cradle of civilizations and the Kurds have a very distinctive role in the
development of these civilizations. This Golden Age ended only with the
arrival of the Arabs, Persians and Turks in the region.79 Consequently,
humanity did not reach the same rate of discoveries, inventions
and civilizations as in the period of Kurdish political hegemony before
534 BC.80
The barbaric Other is generally implied as the logical correspondence to
the civilized Self explicitly described. Mihutuli, nevertheless, states
explicitly that in the early periods of civilizational development no Semites
(Arabs), Persians or Turcomans were in the region. ‘There is no
information’, he continues, ‘about what they did in this period in the Middle
Asian and Arab deserts or in which conditions they lived. It has not been
proven that they have contributed to civilization or science.’ History is seen
as the eternal struggle between the defending, civilized insider and the
aggressive, barbaric outsider. These outsiders did not only attack and
occupy the homeland, furthermore they did not possess a history of
civilization and ‘turn the civilized history upside-down and remove from it
in barbaric and clumsy ways the elements which created civilizations’ .81 As
shown in the myth of resistance the Kurds are seen not to have been
influenced at all by the outsiders. Torî links this to the deep cultural roots of
the Kurds, which reflected Arab, Ottoman and other influences. The Kurds
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introduced their specificity also to Islam, for example by founding their own
tariqat, even though they gave up their own dualistic religions.82
The uncivilized Other is represented in the Islamic periods almost exclu-
sively by the Ottomans–a term used interchangeably with ‘the Turks’. They
built their society, in the framework of a ‘plunder ideology’, merely on mili-
tary bases. After the external expansion had ended, they turned after Sultan
Süleyman I (d.1566) to internal plundering of the conquered territories.83
Consequently, the cruelty of the present-day Turkish army ‘is a heritage of
the Ottomans’.84
The revisionist stance challenges this view on two levels. First, the
single-sourced and encapsulated narrative is refuted. Although the Kurds
are also endowed with special characteristics, these are the products of
reciprocal influence with other peoples. Welat stresses that among the
elements integrated are those of Arab, Persian and Turkish communities.85
Secondly, the definition of other peoples, especially the Turks as barbaric is
questioned. Aksoy hints at the problematic perception of settled peoples
who often considered nomadic peoples to be barbaric owing to the
differences in their way of life. Although he follows a negative description
of Turks, he denies that they can be simply called barbaric.
The inside–outside dichotomy, as worked upon in the myths of national
character and homeland, has a further consequence: historical personalities
who are generally described as Kurds and whose main field of activity was
outside the proper homeland are excluded from the narrative. Saladin, for
instance, is generally not mentioned. In a series on ‘Historical Kurdish
Personalities’ he is not given a full entry, but is only referred to in a half-
sentence.86 In an isolated article on Saladin the Ayyubid confederation is not
labelled as a Kurdish state or integrated into a Kurdish national history.87
One could argue that this is due to the contemporary dispersion of the Kurds
and the difficulties in realizing the national project even in the core regions.
A narrative claiming state history in outside regions seems in this case to be
superfluous. With regard to Saladin, his absence in the sources under
scrutiny might furthermore be linked to the fact that he does not play a
salient role in the Turkish national discourse. Contrary to the situation in the
Iraqi or Syrian sovereign states, the need to ‘reclaim’ him is not a salient
theme for Kurdish historiography in Turkey.
The formation of national identity is not only limited to the content of the
respective identity, but the boundaries of the relevant group play an equally
important part in this process. It has been shown above how the Other and
the Self are defined without actually considering the question of where the
limits of these categories are. Here, I will describe how a group which is a
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subject for discussion is included into the Self by taking the example of the
Alevis.
The Alevis are either defined as a heterodox Islamic sect and community
or as the continuation of pre-Islamic Zoroastrian and Manichaean beliefs.
Generally the former definition is adhered to in the literature.88 Owing to the
differences in definition the term is best seen as a ‘blanket term’ describing
a large number of heterodox groups with largely differing beliefs and
rituals.89 This group is particularly widespread in Anatolia. Their proportion
of the overall population of Turkey is estimated at between 10 and 30–40
per cent. The share of the Kurds among Turkey’s overall Alevis is estimated
at between 10 and 30 per cent, and the share of Alevis among Turkey’s
Kurds at approximately 30 per cent.90 The Alevis in Turkey include Arabic,
Azerbaijani, Turkish and Kurdish speaking groups, with the latter two
groups being quantitatively the most important. The Kurdish speaking
group is divided into speakers of the Zaza dialect and the Kurmanci dialect.
The Alevis have generally supported the Turkish Republic, whose
official secularism promised a certain protection for heterodox groups.
Throughout the existence of the Turkish Republic the importance and
strength of Alevi identity decreased, which led in the early 1980s to
speculation about the disappearance of Alevism as a community. This
changed during the 1980s, which led not only to a vivid debate on the
definition of Alevism,91 but also to a ‘major cultural and political struggle
… for the souls of the Alevis of Turkey’ .92 The major contending loci of
loyalty are thereby Turkish nationalism, Kurdish nationalism and Alevism.
The official Turkish stance towards Alevism has been to define it as a
specific form of Islam linked to pre-Islamic Turcoman roots. It is thereby
often considered to be the heart and soul of Turkish culture, which it
maintained throughout the centuries. The tolerance by official Turkish
institutions regarding the developing crystallization of a specific Alevi
identity in the 1980s has also been aimed at the Kurdish national movement.
With public state support following for Alevis, the Kurdish speaking Alevis
were particularly targeted in order to prevent a shift of identity towards
Kurdish nationalism.
The participants in the Alevi debate during the last decade are, among
others, involved in constructing their own community that had previously
not existed as such. With processes best described as an ‘Invention of
Tradition’ 93 the community is mainly constructed via History. The authors
have, therefore, tended in recent years to de-emphasize the Turkishness of
Alevism and stress the importance of a cultural mosaic in Anatolia.
Nevertheless, nearly all Turkish and Zaza speaking authors agree on a
vaguely defined Turkish origin for Alevism.94 The Kurdishness of Alevism
plays a marginal role within this debate among Alevis. This stance is mainly
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represented by Bender who can be seen as the link between the current
debates on Kurdishness analyzed in the present article and the debate on
Alevism analyzed by Vorhoff.95
The Kurdish national movement also sees Alevis as an important group
for inclusion. As a large part of the Kurdish speaking Alevis speak the Zaza
dialect, this group is of special relevance for the definition of the boundaries
of Kurdishness. The PKK, for instance, has since 1994 published a special
Alevi journal, Zülfikar with the slogan ‘The one who denies his origin is a
bastard!’ 96 Bender argues that Alevism is based on Kurdish roots. In order
to show the Kurdishness of Alevism he advances three main points. Firstly,
he argues that Alevism is an extension of Zoroastrianism, which was the
religion of the Kurds. By citing a number of similarities between the two
beliefs, for example the holiness of fire or monogamy, a continuity is shown
over time in these ‘Kurdish’ religions. Furthermore, Alevism is clearly
dissociated from Islam. By presenting Islam as the aggressive outsider, the
narrative continues that ‘one part of the Kurdish people converted under
compulsion to Islam, while a large part retracted towards the heights of the
Zağros and tried to protect their old beliefs under an Islamic cloak. The
name of this development: Alevism.’ 97 Lastly, he tries to dissociate
Bektas¸ism 98 from Alevism, by representing it as a later development under
the Ottomans, which is not linked, as often claimed, with Hacı Bektas¸ Veli.99
The last point is essential for the question of how to define the group of
Turkish-speaking Alevis. Frequently, this group is implicitly included into
the Kurdish community in the texts under scrutiny. This, either by stating
that the Alevis ‘do not speak any more the language their mothers and
fathers spoke’ 100 or by continuously referring to ‘Kurdish Alevism’,
whereas a ‘Turkish Alevism’ is never mentioned.101 This trend is also
observed by other authors, such as Vorhoff who speaks of an ‘inversion’ of
the Turkish thesis concerning Alevism.102 Nevertheless, the above definition
of a Turkish Bektas¸ism versus a Kurdish Alevism is probably meant to
create a dissociation between Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking Alevis.
Although Bender does not view Bektas¸ism as linked with Hacı Bektas¸ Veli
his writings contain a tendency similar to the phenomenon that appears in
nation-orientated discussions among Alevis: Turkish-speaking Alevis tend
to use Hacı Bektas¸ Veli as their symbol, while Kurdish-speaking Alevis use
the sixteenth-century poet and rebel Pir Sultan Abdal as their symbol.
Demir takes a slightly Inter-Activist stance towards the question of the
roots of Alevism. While he agrees with the broad lines described by Bender,
he stresses that ‘it is impossible to deny that Islam, the other religions in
Anatolia and the Turcomans contributed to the richness of Alevism.’ 103
The discussion concerning the description of the highly contested group
of Alevis shows two major points. Firstly, the subject of Zaza-speaking
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Alevis is not discussed at all. They are implicitly included since they are not
even mentioned as a potential special group within the community of
Kurdish speakers. It seems that the authors here adopt a strategy of silence
towards the Zaza tendency to develop an independent identity. Secondly,
Turkish-speaking Alevis are generally defined as insiders by the writers
irrespective of linguistic factors. Nevertheless, it seems that a dissociation
could occur on the basis of the construction of a Kurdish ‘real’ Alevism
versus a Turkish ‘invented’ Bektas¸ism.
This article examined the way in which early Kurdish history is written
by parts of the Kurdish intellectual elite in Turkey. On the basis of this
examination I shall now conclude with three major points regarding the
actual state of this historiography. However, it is necessary to stress that the
aim of the present article is not to classify Kurdish historiography in
Turkey into rigid and clearly separate categories. The aim is rather to
understand the perception of history within one crucial source in a concrete
period in order to establish a point of departure for future comparative
studies.
This article shows that Kurdish history is vividly discussed by the
Kurdish intellectual elite in Turkey and perceived in a variety of ways. This
is due mainly to the fact that we are dealing with the ideas of an intellectual
elite. It is not necessarily linked to the absence of a central nation-state or
the relatively recent character of Kurdish nationalism on a large scale in
Turkey. The heterogeneity of national historiographies on the elite level
has been shown with regard to its manifestation within Turkey in this
article and is also a widely observed phenomenon with regard to the
European context.104 Thus we are confronted with a normal phenomenon
that has also not been changed by the development of a strong Kurdish
movement, which has been mainly single-centred around the PKK in the
1980s and 1990s.
Although the existence of different perceptions of history demands an
interpretation, the fact that this debate is led in public is much more
surprising for the reader of these sources. Controversial subjects are
discussed openly and at times quite polemically. This openness does not
exist in the quite similar debate on Alevism in Turkey, where a common
identity is discussed and defined as well. This is explained by the aim ‘to
push through interests against an environment experienced to be between
ignorance and hostility, as well as to formulate, form and maintain a
“We”.’105 As this description is also valid for the Kurdish case, it is
questionable if external pressure and internal striving towards homogeneity
are sufficient to explain the degree of openness in a debate.
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Secondly, Kurdish national historiography in Turkey is mainly directed
towards, influenced by and responsive to Turkish national historiography on
a popular level. This is visible in the choice of the geographical area
covered, the redefinition of central myths of Turkish national historiography
and the centrality of this discourse with regard to contested themes, such as
for example Alevism. The Turks are also the main Other, as shown in the
section on the myth of national character. As Vali has argued for the Kurdish
contexts in the different countries and shown in relation to the Iraqi context,
Kurdish national identity emerged in the framework of the relationship
between the Self and the Other, which are the Turkish, Persian and Arab
identities.106 These conditions of the formation of national identity have led
partly to the formulation of a symmetrically inverted Türk Tarih Tezi. This
is not a major tendency in the texts examined, but at least Selahaddin
Mihutuli can be named in this regard. Other national discourses, for instance
the Iranian one, play a less salient role and are not as explicitly referred to.
The fact that Newroz is also the first day of the Iranian calendar or that the
late sixteenth century source S¸erefname was written in Persian are ignored.
Certainly the discourse described above also opposes the discourse on
Muslim unity as adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nevertheless, the
specific conditions of the Kurds in Iran do not seem to influence the
historical perspective. While the Alevi–Sunni split in Turkey is visible, the
Sunni–Twelver Shiite split in Iran does not leave its traces. This is the case
even though the religious split in Iran influences political orientation to a
certain degree: the Twelver Shiite Kurds tended to support Ayatollah
Khomeini and were less enthusiastic for autonomy projects than the Sunni
Kurds.
The Turkish national discourse has a fundamental role in the formation
of the discursive space in which Kurdish identity is discussed. In the
source examined, this relationship is linked (a) to the nature of the source
and the background of the authors and (b) to tactical transformation of the
major player of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in the 1990s: the
PKK.
The texts are published in a popular source – a level where in Turkish
publications the Türk Tarih Tezi remains alive. The readership of these texts,
which are published in Turkish, has been largely educated within the
Turkish national discourse. At the same time, the authors bear the heritage
of the Kurdish, mostly leftist, parties of the 1970s, which were influenced
by Kemalist thoughts and attitudes.
The PKK has, since its foundation in the late 1970s, gone through a
series of tactical transformations. From the proclaimed aim of an
independent unified Kurdistan, via the aim of an independent
Turkish–Kurdistan, it turned in the 1990s to the aim to establish autonomy
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within the Turkish state. This development has been recently carried on
when the PKK declared that it was abandoning the armed struggle in order
to resolve the ‘problems of Turkey’ by democratic means.107 Consequently,
the focus on the Turks as the main Other, on Anatolia as the homeland
or on the Ottoman Empire as the major enemy in the Islamic periods
suggests that the historical imagination has been influenced by these
transformations. In this regard it is not surprising that the relationship with
other Kurdish communities in neighbouring countries is of minor
importance in the framework of the discourse examined. Nevertheless, this
article shows that the concurrential national discourse is not the only point
of reference. Other dimensions of identity, such as for example Alevism or
Islamism, play also an important role in the development of Kurdish
historiography.
Finally, despite the heterogeneity shown above, Kurdish historiography
in Turkey is characterized by a widely shared tendency towards a vision of
a predominantly ethnic history. This tendency is clearer the more an author
adopts Monopolist stances. Ethnic history is understood here as the
perennial approach which regards Kurdishness as a constant factor in
history, defined on biologist or linked essentialist cultural bases. Via the
central myths, peoples, events or geographical areas are included into or
excluded from a continuous narrative of Kurdishness. The ‘motor of
history’ in this narrative is the clash between peoples, expressed
predominantly in the form of the dichotomy between barbarism and
civilization. Marxist approaches are absent despite explicit Marxist stances
in the course of the historiographical discussion.108 The debate between
Monopolists and Inter-Activists therefore remains a question of degree, and
not about whether the concept of ethnic history is valid at all.109 Sakallıoğlu
argues that identity in the Kurdish society has moved from one with strong
religious components in the 1920s–1930s to one with strong class
components in the 1960s–1970s, to one with a predominantly ethnic core
layer in the 1990s.110 Consequently, the sources are a reflection of this shift.
In order to test this link it would be interesting to examine historiographical
texts of the preceding periods.
There are similarities between the sources in this article and Vali’s
reading of the historical writings of the Iraqi Kurds Muhammad Amin Zaki
(published in 1931–33) and Jemal Nebez (published in 1984), in which he
observes an intensification of the ethnic factor. The former’s writings are
largely liberal in perception and do not absolutize ethnic differences or
involve ethnic stereotypes. The latter’s writings, on the contrary, are
characterized by a perennial approach, where perceived national differences
are absolutized and presented as given historical facts.111 As a hypothesis it
can be suggested that the move towards an identity constructed around
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ethnicity is not singular for the Kurdish context in Turkey, but also valid for
Kurdish historiographies in the other sovereign states.
For the future the above findings must be set into a comparative
framework with Kurdish national identities in other nation-states. Although
the point of departure must be the relationship with the respective
hegemonial identity, a comparative outlook will contribute to the depth of
our understanding of the development of Kurdish national identity.
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